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The 1988 Mexican elections appeared to signal a transition in Mexican politics
away from one party rule and toward an open system. This thesis attempts to
identify the underlying economic causes of this trend and its likely future
course. To analyze Mexican politics, the research included books with
background information and contemporary periodical articles to ensure
timeliness. The thesis is organized chronologically beginning in the 1970's
and devotes considerable space to the emerging role of opposition groups and
the likely course of future events. It was discovered that the opening of the
political system is tied to two major variables--economic policy and the
emerging need for political alternatives. These two factors coincide to
reduce the legitimacy of the ruling party and government. As a result, the
. government has been forced to open the system to retain some credibility. The
conclusion. attempts to predict the future course of events. Mexico is heading
toward an open political system but will arrive there only after further
economic pains and possibly some social unrest. The future of the economic





Mexico: The Political Consequences of Restructuring
The stunning results of the July 6, 1988 election for the presidency of
Mexico focused attention on the changing Mexican political system. For sixty
years, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had easily won the
presidency by large majorities; however, in 1988, the PRI candidate, Harvard
educated Carlos Salinas de Gortari, narrowly received a majority of the votes
and defeated the two opposition candidates, Manuel Clouthier of the rightist
National Action Party (PAN) and Cuahtemoc Cardenas of the leftist Cardenist
Front for National Reconciliation (FCRN). As is the case in most elections,
the economy and economic policy were at the forefront of the election
campaign. This thesis will examine the important role economic conditions and
.
development policies play in the changing electorial process in Mexico. The
role of other factors will also be considered as will the course of future
events. In doing this, it is first necessary to present a brief background of
Mexico under the PRI.
The PRI was created in 1929 (its original name was the National
Revolutionary Party). It was created in a system in which the presidential
term was six years (sexenio) and re-elections were prohibited. The party
assumed power in a country which had seen a half million persons killed,
villages destroyed, and its economy in shambles after years of bitter
revolution and civil war. Under the sexenio of Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940)
numerous political and labor reforms were enacted. However, to receive
benefit from the reform, one had to jOin the party or an affiliated
organization. Furthermore, businessman were excluded from the party and its
. organizations (yet the PRI is basically a pro-business party). Within the
political system, power is centralized in the presidency; consequently, the
.
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judicial and legislative branches of government are weak. Mexican law gives
bureaucrats considerable power. The system created flexibility as well as
corruption. The PRI apparatus controls the election process. Although the
PRI traditionally has restricted numerous civil rights, it has presided over
considerable economic growth.
During the period between 1940 to 1970, Mexico experienced tremendous
economic growth. The nation's gross national product increased at an annual
average of 6%. However, the population grew steadily and the economic
benefits were distributed unevenly. The government maintained a role as a
major investor within the country. Also, during this time, industrialization
grew rapidly and became an important aspect of the economy. Despite the
.
impressive economic growth during this period. . Mexico has experienced severe
economic problems since the early 1970's. It is at this point that this
thesis will examine the underlying changes in the Mexican economic and
political systems since 1970.
The Echeverria Sexenio: Problems of LeQitimacy
During the late 1960's many Mexicans (the middle class, intellectuals,
students and business people) became virtually nonparticipant in the
government, this created a feeling of exclusion from the political process.
The middle class was particularly concerned with the lack of representation,
this coincided with a worldwide student movement. Together, these two
conditions festered the student protests of 1968. The political bureaucracy
was divided on how to deal with these protests. The brutal repression which
ensued delivered a blow to the already dubious legitimacy of the PRI (Newell
. 110). Consequently, in 1968 the consensus about the government began to erode
and the party began to come under attack from broad based factions on both the
left and the right (114). Since that occurred, the PRI has been under a semi-
permanent state of crisis and its relative position has declined (114). Luis
Echevarria became the Mexican president in 1970. He understood that the
.
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regime's legitimacy was threatened so he adopted leftist rhetoric and
progressive reforms (123).
The reforms Echevarria initiated indicate that he may have felt it was
the final opportunity for the PRI to reform (Hellman 190). Echevarria's
.
reforms attempted to redistribute income and increase social services (192).
Echevarria also attempted to create rapid economic growth through heavy
government spending (Newell 190). His policies had severe economic and
political consequences. The increase in public sector spending was not met by
a corresponding increase in revenues causing a rise in the federal deficit
(130). The Mexican federal deficit grew from 4.8 billion pesos in 1970 to 42
billion pesos in 1976. Furthermore, the peso's competitive rate became
overvalued which raised the price of Mexican goods and reduced sales and
export revenues (Hellman 209). The overvalued peso caused a loss of 4 to 6
billion pesos as a result of capital flight from the upper class (197). The
loss of capital investments caused a recession in the economy. Foreign
borrowing increased the inflation rate which outstripped the rising wages
(198). Eventually, the peso was devalued (210). With the decline in the role
of private sector investment, the state's role expanded in every sector of the
economy causing a rapid expansion of the state (200).
Echevarria attempted to maintain the failing consensus of the PRI by
distributing economic dividends to all. The policy created corresponding
. economic problems. Consequently, the economic solution to the problems of
legitimacy created more damage to the political system than would have a
with the private sector to increase productivity (Newell 205). With limits on
the bureaucracy, cuts in welfare spending and a floating rate peso recovery
was rapid. There was a return of capital and a lower balance of payments
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political solution. Like Echevarria, Jose Lopez Portillo's later policies
would accelerate the descent towards financial and economic chaos.
LODez: The Politiss of Oil
Jose Lopez Portillo became president in 1976. His term in office
witnessed the rise of political reforms and continued economic crisis. Lopez'
administration suffered from nagging Mexican problems: diminishing
agricultural returns, uncompetitive industries, an inability to cut the
budget, and losses of revenue.
Lopez initially prepared a severe austerity program which implied major
cuts in economic and social spending. In addition, he also attempted to work
.
deficit (Hellman 218). However, discovery of huge reserves of oil in Mexico
led to new revenues, increased spending and continued deficits (Newell 218).
Lopez found that he was unable to prevent inflation by increase the pumping of
oil to meet the rising expectations (Hellman 219). Despite the oil income,
revenues were insufficient to meet new budget increases (220). The oil income
also created a boom in government spending to improve industrial
infrastructure in order to develop an export led economic growth (219). Lopez
exceeded Echevarria's policy of creating state business, however, most went
bankrupt (Lake 41). Billions of dollars were wasted on oil projects (Kondrake
18) and Lopez allowed the deterioration and collapse of non oil exports.
. Because export income was weakened, Lopez turned to foreign borrowing. Mexico
thus experienced on eight fold increase in foreign debt from 1976-1982
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(Hellman 220). The overvalued peso again led to capital flight and a
devaluation resulted in the doubling of the foreign debt (223). The fall of
the price of oil in the early 1980's created a tremendous deficit. Lopez
looked abroad to finance the deficit and the foreign debt skyrocketed to $80
billion by 1982. Foreign banks were forced to bailout Mexico when it
couldn't meet its payments because the banks were overextended in the country
(224). One of Lopez' final economic policies was to nationalize the banks in
Mexico.
The expropriation of banks in Mexico created two opposing groups within
the civil society with members of the party choosing sides (Newell 263).
Lopez' initial programs of austerity required political room to maneuver from
.
the left; thus, Lopez attempted to institute political reform to appease the
left (205). Lopez' political reforms contained three elements. First,
legitimization of parties on the left of PRI. Second, it guaranteed 100 out
of 400 representative seats to the opposition in the Chamber of Deputies.
Third, amnesty for political prisoners. The goals of these measures were to
give the opposition a voice, to channel discontent and to increase the
prospects of co-optation; what the reform did was to produce a flourishing of
left wing parties (Mexico's 106). In summary, the efforts by Lopez (as well
as Echevarria) to revive populism in order to sustain legitimacy, failed and
created a huge rise in the public sector bureaucracy (161). His policies also
destroyed the chance Mexico had to fully develop using oil revenues (Lake 41).
Because of Lopez' failed policies, the new president, Miguel de la Madrid,
faced numerous economic problems.
. De 1a Madrid and Economic RestructurinQ in the 1980's
Miguel de la Madrid's economic policy included a change in trade and
.
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investment policy. He embraced export promotion and privatization of the
economy because it was a way to restructure the troubled economy (Mexico's
83). The policy of export promotion included pushing Mexico into the world
market. Under Madrid's sexenio (1982-1988), Mexico joined the General
agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), began to promote non-oil exports, and
opened the door for increased foreign investment. Business confidence grew as
a result of these policies (Baker 78). In 1985, the Mexican government
announced it would lower protection on eight key industrial sectors. This was
done to an increased competitive ability of non-oil industries so as to lessen
dependence on petroleum exports (Mexico's 65). It is ironic that before the
mid 1970's, a distinctive feature of Mexico's successful economic development
.
was a diversified pattern of exports. The factor which made the 1970's so
exciting -- the oil boom -- was also the cause of the undoing of this
traditional source of economic strength (58). It was clear that by 1985, more
steps had to be taken to help increase the non oil exports of Mexico. Despite
Madrid's policies, by 1985 oil still accounted for 70-75% of Mexico's foreign
currency earnings and for 45%of the entire government revenue. This occurred
even after the drop in the price of oil during the early 1980's (58). Another
recovery policy was to place the peso on a free float which caused major
devaluations. These policies created certain trends in the economy during
this decade.
Along the Mexican/U.S. border labor intensive assembly plants, called
maquiladores, began to flourish. These assembly plants are closely tied to
the U.S. economy and include such corporations as Zenith, General Motors,
. Hitachi and Sony. These companies locate in Mexico because the workers are
among the lowest paid in the world (LaBotz 180). These maquiladores represent
.
an important source of foreign investment and are crucial to the PRI's
recovery and modernization goals (Aguilar 55). Another result of the export
promoting policies is that property and labor incomes of the export sector
have performed relatively well. Furthermore, foreign investment has increased
overall (Mexico's 78) there was a repatriation of capital and non oil exports
did rise (Graham 30). Despite some success with these policies, the Mexican
government still faced economic problems are well as political problems and
corruption.
Political Conseauences of Economic Restructurinq
As is the case in the United States, the economy of Mexico has
.
tremendous political ramifications. It appears that the revolutionary
consensus of the PRI is evaporating. A recent New York Times poll in Mexico
provides evidence of widespread discontent in Mexico. The poll found that 54%
of Mexicans believe that their economy will never recover and that the
government serves its own interests rather than the people's. Furthermore,
two out of three Mexicans desire more democracy. The evolving attitudes are
the result of frustration over austerity measures, the lack of a political
outlet and corruption.
Many of Madrid's economic and austerity policies have had negative
affects on Mexican society. It was estimated in 1987 that one thousand
persons lost their job everyday as a result of Madrid's policy of moving the
system toward privatization (Weiner 54). Further problems in the economy
occurred because the United States initiated new laws which allowed only on
influx of skilled workers from Mexico. This closed off a safety valve for
. Mexico and allowed into the United States, workers which Mexico could ill




billion debt were merely stop gap measures (Graham 31) and Mexico's domestic
debt are more burdensome than its foreign debt (Lake 41). Perhaps the
greatest crisis occurred because of a reaction to austerity.
In 1985, Mexico was required to institute budget cutbacks in virtually
all areas of the government. This occurred because of conditions on a $4
billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan (Hellman 230). One result of
.
the austerity program was that the least competitive government owned
industries disappeared (231). After years of austerity, the majority of
Mexicans are suffering (Baker 79). Inflation has continually hovered over the
100%mark and the foreign debt is in excess of $120 billion. Furthermore, the
purchasing power of Mexicans has fallen by over 40% (Kondrake 16) and Mexicans
are spending 60-70% of their wage of food (Lake 40). This has occurred for
three main reasons. First, part of the governments austerity program was wage
restraint to help control inflation. This occurred at a time of high
inflation which seriously eroded the incomes of many Mexicans. Second, there
is a high level of overt unemployment and less obvious underemployment.
Finally, the government policy of liberalization of price controls and a more
realistic exchange rate increased prices considerably (Mexico's 75). It is
arguable that the level of discontent over austerity would have been greater
if the PRI did not have control over the unions (Graham 31). It is clear to
see why Mexico faces many political questions as a result of the PRI's
domination of the economy and its polices. Clearly the PRI's handling of the
economic crisis it helped create, caused many Mexicans to question not only
the policies but the entire system.
.
The 1988 Elections: An Outlet of Frustration?
.
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The 1988 Mexican presidential and congressional elections may have
marked a turning point in Mexican political evolution. Madrid's designated
successor. Carlos Salinas de Gortari, faced the usually difficulty task of
winning votes on a platform which included, at the minimum, continued
.
austerity. There was virtually, no doubt that Salinas would win (as he did).
Nevertheless, the election was the closest in sixty years of PRI control of
the government. The considerable delay in announcing the results of the
voting was interpreted by many as a result of PRI infighting over the margin
of victory which should be announced. The announced vote total gave Salinas a
narrow victory and may have been a symbol of the new opening of the process.
Indeed, Salinas conceded that the days of one party domination were over
(Riding 1). The economic crisis of the seventies and eighties brought an
abrupt end to the Mexican economic miracle. In addition, social conditions
appeared to deteriorate. Political conditions also began to change in the
1980's. Political discontent has resulted from a disruption of longstanding
political bargains and accommodations. The 1982 bank nationalizations
severely weakened an informal agreement between the ruling elite and the
business sector (Mexico's 101). .This has occurred as the nation's businessmen
have increased their economic power as a result of Madrid's policy of
privatization of the economy. Furthermore, the businessmen have increased
their political power although they cannot directly be represented within the
party. Their political power has increased as a result of its influence
though its popular sector of the PRI, through its control over appointments,
pressure groups, the cooperation of important American partners and through
. joining parties such as the PAN(Hellman 211). Coupled with the growing
strength, many commercial groups believe that the rules of the economic and
..
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political game must be changed to create a new legal and political climate
conducive to economic growth (Aguilar 50). In addition to business
displeasure over the economy, a large segment of the population, including the
middle class, believes that one party rule is responsible for the economic
crisis (Dowling 46). Also, a large amount of working class persons have lost
much of their buying power and desire broader participation in the political
process (Baker 65). There are other problems for the PRI. Blatant and
widespread corruption has created disenchantment (Mexico's 101). Furthermore,
opposition parties have created a new an vigorous challenge for the PRI (101).
The opposition has increased strength partly because the PRI altered the
political structure under Lopez to relieve economic pressures (Rohter 3). All
of these factors helped make Salinas the least popular candidate of the PRI in
years (Dowling 46).
Despite the many problems, it appears that Salinas will not drastically
alter Mexico's economic policy. In fact, it was Salinas who, under Madrid, is
responsible for many of the PRI's economic policies. Clearly, the crash of
the Mexican stock market (occurring after the fall of the U.S. market)
dampened Salinas' campaign (Graham 30). Although there is tremendous pressure
on Salinas to relax austerity, he will most likely continue the policy of
holding down wages and devaluing the peso in order to generate exports (Baker
65). These policies give Salinas the label of anti-labor. Other items in
Salinas' economic agenda include continuation of lowering trade barriers, and
selling three hundred state owned business (Dowling 47). These policies may
boost business confidence in the government but many Mexican's and their
. unions fear a loss of jobs. Salinas must also manage a complex price control
scheme few Mexicans believe will work (47). Clearly, there is increasing
.
12
discontent over the economic policies and many are beginning to criticize the
legitimacy of the PRI.
Politics of the PRI
.
The PRI controls the government of Mexico like a big city political
machine used to control American cities (Kondrake 17). Patronage job are
given out to loyal PRI supporters and virtually every sector of Mexico is
influenced by the PRI. Furthermore, the PRI controls the election process,
vote fraud is often used to maintain levels of PRI representation (18). What
it amounts to is that the PRI has been able to indefinitely perpetuate its
power despite numerous economic and political problems. Although the PRI may
be compared to a big city machine, it has considerably more power to control
events. The government controls 70% of the economy and labor leaders control
workers and deliver their vote to the PRI. Much of the land on which most
peasants live is controlled by the PRI. Finally, business must openly support
the PRI in order to maintain benefits from the PRI. For sixty years (until
the 1988 election) those controls have ensured that no president, governor or
senator was elected who was not a PRI member. This had occurred despite the
fact that a gallup poll, taken before the formation of a left-wing coalition,
in Mexico revealed that only 40%of the population supported the PRI whereas
19%supported the PAN, 30% favored no party, and 10%supported other left
parties. The left wing coalition headed by Cardenas captured considerable
support in the 1988 election from those who previously favored no party (17).
Clearly, coercion or pressure had to be placed on persons to force them to
support the PRIor else some other party would have been able to win at least
. one larger election. The recent trend in Mexican presidential elections is
toward lowering the percentile of votes for the PRI nominee. The PRI share of
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votes fell from 80% in earlier presidential elections to a little over 50% in
the 1988 elections. However, because the opposition is fractionalized and
divided between right wing and left wing parties with the PRI as the centrist
party, the PRI would probably win at least a plurality in free and open
elections (Aguilar 52). There are other factors which favor the PRI. First,
because there is no credible alternative to the PRI power currently, the
people are unwilling to commit themselves to other parties (53). Second, the
debate over the fairness of the system has not created a disruption in the
relationship between the people and the PRI controlled state (52). What all
these factors may point to, is a change in the way the PRI conducts its
business politically.
PRI and government arrangements have failed to channel important
political demands through the party's electoral process. The increasing
demands of the Mexican population are a product of material deprivation and
democratic aspirations (Mexico's 161). For years, the essential aspect of
stability in Mexico was that the state alternated the influence of one group
against that of another. However, in the long run the state has favored the
private sector over the public's interest (4). This has created a catalyst
for uneven development. By the late 1970's, the upper 10%of the population
held 36.7% of the entire national family income whereas the lowest 30% of the
population accounted for only 6%of national family income (Aguilar 44).
These numbers show a tremendous disparity between the small upper class and
the vast lower class. Thus, the political system helped create two worlds,
the rhetorical passages of economic and political equality in the 1917
. constitution and the real world of uneven development and informal power codes
.
(43). Despite this truth, there is still a frequency in the United States to
and business groups (10). The system of a strong president and bureaucracy
has created another unforeseen side affect--corruption.




overstate the political influence of the Mexican upper class, middle class,
independent and enormous bureaucracy creates a system which is ripe for
corruption. The corruption in the system is further enhanced by the
availability of large sums of "drug" money as a result of the sale of illegal
narcotics. Because all ruling politicians and bureaucrats are from the PRI,
they tend to hide corruption. Therefore, the real thieves in the government
are able to retain untroubled, possession of money (Lake 40). Indeed, a prime
example is the fact that President Lopez Portillo left office a very rich man
(41). What these conditions have done is to erode the legitimacy and immense
power of the PRI.
The legitimacy of a regime is related to the stability of the regime
(Lake 2) and its responsiveness to the political and societal values of the
population. Clearly, the PRI is lacking in these two areas. The slow shift
in the PRI political and economic values toward more private sector
involvement is changing the leadership's stability and, consequently, its
legitimacy (3). The PRI's political policy has been to integrate and co-opt
the opposition. Although these policies are created to help maintain control
our other interests, the PRI strategy of integration of opponents into
sanctioned competition assures the opposition a means to express their views,
resources to campaign, and the opportunity to build their own constituencies
and interests within the system (Aguilar 51). There are other reasons to
. explain the loss of some of the PRI's tremendous power. The PRI can be
thought of as a semi-authoritarian, hegemonic party which acts as an
.
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instrument of government to maintain the social elites in power (Mexico's
159). The PRI is thus an extension of a strong presidency and the
bureaucracy. The decline of the PRI could reflect a decline in the
presidential system which manifests itself into a decline of PRI functions.
Consequently, significant changes in the political system will not result from
party discussion and decisions but from the president and bureaucracy (160).
A final determinant in the decline of the PRI is tied to civil society. As
the number of civil servants who were not PRI members grew, the PRI hegemony
began to weaken (Newell 269). Whatever the cause of the decline of the PRI's




The 1988 elections witnessed the emergence of two very strong
challengers for the presidency. For the first time since the PRI took power,
it was faced with widespread opposition to its rule. The two challengers were
Manuel Clauthier of the National Action Party (PAN) and Cuahtemoc Cardenas
Solorzano of the Cardenist Front for National Reconstruction (FCRN). The
coalition was named after Cardenas' father Lozaro Cardenas who was a beloved
leader of the revolution. These two opposition groups were opposed by the PRI
with Salinas as their candidate. Because the PRI controls the media, the
election apparatus and, consequently, the elections, many observers wrote off
the seriousness of the threat posed by the two challengers. Despite the odds
against them, the challengers lowered the percentage of votes going to the PRI
. candidate to only 50.32%. To understand the rising challenge to the PRI, one
must understand the older challenge of the PANand the emerging challenge of a
..
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coalition of left wing parties.
The right wing PANattracts primarily businessmen. Recently, however,
many moderates have joined the PANin order to campaign for curbing state
authority (Aguilar 50). The party has tremendous power in the northern states
which border the United States which may be attributed to the growth of
business in the area. PANalso maintains considerable support in Mexico City.
The strengths of the PANalso reflect its weaknesses. The PAN is weak in the
rural areas where much of the population lives. A major criticism of the PAN
is that it maintains no strong idealogy (Mexico's 106). This criticism
suggests that the sole purpose of the PAN is to oppose the PRI. Despite these
weaknesses, the PAN is well organized and gaining in strength. This assertion
is reinforced by the fact that since political reforms in the late 1970's made
it easier for opposition parties to win seats in the Chamber of Deputies, the
PANhas enjoyed an upsurge in support. The PANhas also made numerous gains
among the urban middle class (Hellman 237). Despite a relatively promising
future for the PAN, it appears that the major threat to the PRI comes from the
left leaning parties.
Because the PRI is, by definition, a revolutionary party devoted to
equality, it would seem to be open more to challenge from the right, however,
because of its economic shift to a centrist party the PRI has opened itself to
challenges from the left. The PRI's acceptance of the center of the political
spectrum, flanked by an emerging left and an aggressive right, has led to a
weakening of the PRI's claim as the sole inheritor of the nations revolution.
The loss of this symbolism has enabled the opposition to attract voters and
. intellectuals. It has been easier for the left to attract these persons away
from the PRI. Another problem for the PRI is that, as a centrist party, it
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may suffer from a splintering of factions away from the center causing a loss
in hegemony. This would most likely lead to pluralization and democratization
or worse to reaction and repression (Mexico's 106-197). In fact, a
fragmentation has also occurred within the party. In 1960, a group emerged
within the PRI called the Democratic Current which was composed of a group of
liberals who denounced the traditional Mexicans notions of power. They
attempted to rally the PRI members and the entire Mexican society against the
closed political system (Aguilar 50). The group originally attempted to work
within the PRI. The electoral reforms of 1977 and 1986 were an attempt by the
PRI to adapt their electoral monopoly without losing the presidency (51). The
minor changes still virtually assumed PRI control of the presidency The PRI
.
presidential succession system remained secret and closed to questions because
the president maintains the power to name his successor within the PRI.
Because of this, the dissident PRI faction, still called the Democratic
Current, which was led by Cuahtemoc Cardenas Solorzano, withdrew from the
party after Salinas, the Harvard educated technocrat, was named the chosen
successor of Madrid (Baker 65). Cardenas and his followers split with the PRI
and charged the party with corruption and betraying the revolution. Cardenas
pushed for an end to the economic policies urged by the United States and the
IMF. He opposed policies of austerity, exports and open markets. Instead,
he is a supporter of giving priority to basic human needs. His economic
policy would include the following: 1) channeling money to agriculture to
help alleviate the rural poor's conditions, 2) provide financial incentives to
small and medium sized business, and 3) end the emphasis on large industrial
. development. Cardenas also feels that oil reserves must be conserved and that
production and drilling should be cut back. Cardenas is adored by the left in
18
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Mexico and he was able to form his own political organization. He appeared
able to attract many PRI members and intellectuals who are liberal and linked
to the 1968 student protests. Cardenas thus helped form the leftist coalition
for the 1988 elections. The coalition consisted of the FCRN, the Mexican
Unified Socialist Party (PSUM) and small right wing groups allied against the
PRI. The coalition attempted an alliance with the PANbut an agreement could
not be reached. Cardenas became the candidate for president and the head of
the coalition which was named the National Democratic Front (FDN) (Lake 30).
Although it had a strong showing in 1988 elections, it is not known if the FDN
represents a true viable form in Mexican politics or merely a weak coalition
.
united only when facing the PRI. These are other problems which the FDNmust
face. Leftist movements have traditionally been destroyed by the PRI through
co-optation or repression. Furthermore, many Mexicans are cynical about
movements which are revolutionary or leftist in nature because most have
nothing to show for the major leftist revolution of 1917 (Hellman 239). The
FDNas well as the PANonly slightly challenged their election losses after
the election and this may have paved the way for a wider role in future
governments (Rohter 3).
The final results in the July 6, 1988 Mexican presidential election race
were Salinas with 50.32% of the vote, Cardenas with 31.11% of the vote, and
Clouthier with 17.7% of the vote. In addition the PRI won 261 out of 500
Chamber of deputy seats to maintain a slim majority. Still, there are
questions about how much power opposition parties will have in the Chamber of
Deputies because the president maintains considerable power (Mexico's 186).
.
Nevertheless, the chamber is at least a place to air views and debate with
media coverage (187). The future of the opposition groups certainly seems to
.
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be brighter at the end of the 1980's than at any time in the past sixty years.
The future generation of Mexicans may very will have more than one political
choice.
Mexican Politics and Contemporary Society
The combination of economic difficulties, business alliances with
opposition parties and U.S. criticism may have caused a changing attitude in
Mexico about the political system (Mexico's 178). It appears that the level
.
of tolerance for the austerity programs may diminish as a result of the fact
that governmental layoffs have begin to seriously affect the middle class (8).
This occurred as the need to shrink the budget caused government layoffs and
sales of public enterprises to private ownership (54). In general, the people
have lost patience with inflation, crime waves, poverty, corruption and PRI
control over the judiciary, congress, treasury, police, election apparatus,
and the media (Lake 40). Another future problem is that at a time when the
economy is growing slowly (if at all) more than half the population is under
the age of twenty. There are numerous demographic factors which will affect
Mexican politics. Because of the large number of young persons. One million
new persons enter the work force every year. This will put a huge strain on
the economy if it does not expand enough to absorb them (Yergin 19). In
addition to the problem of the large amount of young persons there are other
trends which may bring trouble to the PRI. The Mexican population is becoming
increasingly urbanized, better educated and politically active. Consequently,
Salinas' push for a more open economy must also be met with a more open
political system (18). This must occur despite the fact that the PRI's power
.
will be weakened as a result of opposition availability and problems with
modernization and economic crisis (Larmer 13). Because of increased
.
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urbanization, many leaders of the political parties maintain an urban bias
(Mexico's 189). Despite the urban bias, the greatest amount of PRI support
comes from rural areas because many peasants (Ejiditarios) live on PRI
controlled land. Nevertheless, despite this fact of strong support, it is the
rural persons who receive the least from the PRI. Coincidentally, Cardenas,
in the 1988 election, held out support and benefits for the rural population.
Unless the PRI reevaluates its relationship with the rural areas, it may be
difficult to maintain PRI support in rural areas (190). Perhaps the biggest
test will be if, and how well, Salinas can spread the distribution of wealth
to determine if a comprehensive democratic transformation can proceed with
modernization (Aguilar 42).
.
ProsDects for the future
Many PRI insiders believe that a true democratic opening will increase
Mexican vulnerability and adversely affect economic growth (Aguilar 58). Many
wonder if an emerging democratization will cause a change in the role of the
military (Mexico's 143). There are numerous questions concerning the future
of Mexico's economic and political system. There are no definite answers to
the question of Mexico's changing circumstances but there are some clues as to
what direction Mexico will move economically and politically.
There is little double that Salinas will continue with the economic
policy he helped create. He will almost certainly continue with
privatization, opening the country to trade, pushing non-oil exports
industries, still relying on oil income and continued government austerity
programs. Salinas must make Mexican business and industry more competitive.
~
By cutting industries away from the public sector into the private sector,
wasteful government subsidies will be eliminated. This will force these
the welcoming of foreign investment. Again this brings in foreign revenue but
it also opens up the Mexican economy so that it is tied to the industrial
states. This could create political problems for Salinas because of the
.
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business to become more efficient and will save government revenue. The
problem with this policy is that it also has the potential to create
widespread unemployment as business' fold or eliminate unneeded or extra
employees. This would cause a problem for a society whose population is young
and growing. The task of pushing non-oil exports and entering the world
market are interrelated. Mexico needs access to foreign markets and
consequently, had to open its own market to the world. Joining GATT was a
wise but difficult move because it opened Mexican markets and made some
industries vulnerable to foreign competition. This caused the elimination of
some non-competitive business and exacerbated the unemployment problems.
However, non-oil export sectors have shown a increase in growth and are
.
relatively prospering. Despite the move away from oil exports, Mexico still
must rely on petroleum to bring in badly needed foreign revenue to help
alleviate its foreign debt problems. This causes concern for many Mexicans
who wish to conserve this very important resource. Another economic policy is
Mexican attitude of independence. Austerity is a major factor in the economic
policy of Mexico. Because of its huge foreign and domestic debt, the Mexican
government will have to maintain tight control over spending. This will
undoubtedly continue political woes but economic disaster could be the
alternative. There are some positive signs for the Mexican economy and the
outlook is cautiously optimistic. If Mexico can ride out the storm it may
~
well be on its way to economic recovery, although tremendous income
disparities will remain and possibly increase.
.
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It is almost certain that Salinas' economic policies will cause him and
the PRI numerous political problems. What is more difficult to predict with
certainty is the future course of the political system. It is obvious that
political reforms of the last decade, the growing political cognition of the
populace, and the problems with economic recovery are all pushing the country
toward a more open system of government. The increasing privatization of the
economy requires an opening of debate on economic policy. This, in turn,
.
requires an opening of the political system. Some leaders of the PRI seem to
recognize this fact. Another problem is that the growing political knowledge
of the population seems to erode the legitimacy of the government as the
population understands its closed nature. There is a growing frustration over
the lack of political channels over which to voice opinions and attitudes. It
seems ironic that a government which claims to be open to the people and
revolutionary in nature closes itself off from the population and prevents
input from the outside. The PANwill continue to be a viable opposition but
has limited room for expansion. The FDN, if it can remain united, has the
most potential for growth. It may well be able to lure enough intellectuals
and liberals away from the PRI to make it a strong alternative.
Unfortunately, it is also the political front which has the most questions
about its viability. The PRI will most likely continue to be the majority
party at least until the year 2000. However, the party will loss support as
it continues on a relatively unpopular economic course. It appears that the
PRI may also drift more toward the right of center in the coming years. The
1994 elections will be more open as a result of Salinas' desire to liberalize
~
the political system as he opens up the economic system. The future of the




political system will continue to open.
Because Mexico is a Latin American country there are incessant questions
about possible military intervention in the government. The Mexican army is a
professional force and under civilian control. There is little prospect of
military intervention into government because of its professionalism and
because such a role would be internally divisive and costly to Mexico's
prestige. In short, there appears to be nothing which can be gained by
military intervention.
After sixty years of PRI rule, the economic and political system of
Mexico appears to be opening. Democratization creeps slowly to the fore of
Mexican politics. Furthermore, the Mexican economy may be on the road to
recovery after the disastrous years of the 1970's and 1980's. Clearly, the
Mexicans must move forward cautiously but continuing the economic and
political liberalization begun under Madrid in the 1980's. There may be some
unrest in the near future but Mexico's future prospects appear brighter.
Lake, George Byron. National Review.
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